The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypothese
Introduction
This is a summary of an article by
William Rose on the security dilemma and ethnic conflict on the role that
security dilemma plays in ethnic conflicts. What he has done is putting the
theory on security dilemma into perspective. Building upon the hypotheses
already presented by Posen, Rose goes on to propose an additional five more
hypotheses and endeavours to demonstrate their workability to the support of
this theory. He has taken Croatia and Ukraine as a case study however his
findings should not be uniquely limited to these two as they can be applicable
elsewhere.
The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict
The post cold war world is among other
issues characterized by the ethnic civil wars. These civil wars have painted
the contemporary world with ugly images ranging from the genocide in Rwanda,
the destruction of cities in Chechnya, to desperate cases of massive numbers of
refugees fleeing terror in Kosovo, and Bosnia among others. Unfortunately these
wars have witnessed some dreadful occurrences such as ethnic cleansing and the
use of rape as a weapon of war.
Departing from the fact that after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, some states such as Arzebaijan entered into ethnic
warfare, the concern here is on what happens upon the collapse of multinational
powers or empires and how perceptions of individual and group security inform
ethnic war or peace. Particularly how intense security dilemma causes ethnic
wars and of course prescription as to how the occurrence of such wars can be
prevented. This is build upon the security dilemma which is one of the most
basic concepts of neo-realism.
When and empire or a multinational power
collapses there arises serious security issues which are mainly based on a
possible power vacuum whether really or perceived. What normally faces the
different groups is an urgent need to ensure their security and survival in a
situation which is characterized by this condition of arising anarchy. The problem
which often arises is that the measures which a certain group may take to
address and enhance its own security may jeopardize another group’s security
thus leading to suspicion, threats and anxiety. The greater the perception of
the security threats and opportunities, the more intense the security dilemma,
unfortunately, the more intense the security dilemma means more dangerous group
actions and reactions. This could explain the phenomenon of ethnic wars
experienced during the period immediately following the collapse of
multinational power or empire because ethnic war is more likely when security
dilemma is intense. Peace and war become dependent variables and intensity of
the security dilemma becomes their determining variable. There are five other variables
identified by Posen but they all build upon this pioneer variable. These five
interact at different levels and makes ethnic war more likely because they
intensify the security dilemma. Due to scarcity of security, arms race ensues and
when groups see their neighbours reinforcing cohesion, they also do the same
leading to preventive war and defensive expansionist and each group gets
obsessed with the urge to attack first due to the uncertainty with which this
security dilemma is engulfed.
Security dilemma and ethnic conflict
Ethnic civil war is more likely when the
security dilemma is perceived to be intense. There are ten hypotheses drawn
from the intense security dilemma and which make ethnic civil war more likely;
five of them have been proposed by Posen and the other five have been added by
Rose. Posen’s hypotheses emphasize military issues while those of Rose bend
towards political and diplomatic relations between the groups. On the one hand
there are perceptions of intense security dilemma as an independent variable
and on the other, ethnic civil war as a dependent variable. All the ten
hypotheses are therefore intervening variables.
Hypotheses for Security
According to Posen the emphasis is on military issues and the
hypotheses are: more intense arms racing, competitive political mobilizations,
large windows due to relative power
shifts, increasing incentives for preventive war, defensive expansion
incentives and lastly moving first becomes more rewarding.
According to Rose, however, the focus
shifts to diplomacy having the following emphasis: fait accompli and blame
shifting are more common and more dangerous, fewer negotiations and agreements,
excess secrecy of political strategies and military plans and formation of
unconditional alliances in peacetime.
Stages of Ethnic Conflict
Three main stages have been examined by
the scholarly work in security dilemma; an early stage of instability, the
conduct of war and the ending of war. The initial stage is always very important
because in it there are possibilities to prevent mass violence and to minimize
causalities and hardships (avoid escalation). When violence ensues ethnic
identities harden and populations often increasingly view the other group as an
enemy to be annihilated. Hardliners
seize such an opportunity to perpetuate their interests through
political mobilizations often with a tag that conciliation is dangerous or traitorous.
At this stage handling the situation is much more complicated than if it were
to be done at an early stage with preventive measures.
Criticisms
There have been competing explanations
as well as possible criticisms focusing on different levels of analysis, also
on the presence or absence of ancient hatred. But also domestic politics and
processes play a key role for instance Gagnon argues that ethnic violence is
caused not by external security concerns but by the dynamics of conflicts
within the group.
Arfi holds that identities and interests
should be considered as variables. In this case reconstruction of social
identities is important because the consequences of such reconstructions sometimes
include ethnic violence. He therefore puts more causal impact on domestic
structures and politics than Rose does through identification of the fact that
security dilemma causes an aggressive social identity.
Hostile reactions are directly
proportional to the level of security dilemma. We realize that in this
perspective, Rose concurs with Posen on the fact that the various sources of an
intense security dilemma have a great influence on prospects for conflict
regardless of the politics inherited from old empires.
Security Dilemma: Its Intensity and Ethnic Conflict
What we realize is that civil wars are
the most common and perhaps the prevalent kinds of wars fought in latter days
and the security dilemma continue to be the major cause of such wars which are
characterizing the contemporary world. In order to respond to these wars and to
seek redress, there is need to understand the security dilemma and how it makes
war more likely.
Following the realist philosophy, one of
the major concerns of any group is self help. This meets with Rose’s argument
that the result of a theory of foreign policy applies to ethnic groups
experiencing self help conditions leading to probabilistic predictions based on
the uncertainty surrounding security dilemma. The essence is that one ethnic
group’s measure to ensure its security becomes a threat to another thus causing
the anxiety experienced in the security dilemma. The security dilemma is
intense when defensive and offensive military forces are indistinguishable and
when offence has the advantage over defence. Since cohesion can be used in
either way (defensive or offensive) the purposes of political cohesion are
actually indistinguishable thus one group’s efforts towards political
mobilization endangers the other group the same way as military might does.
The major theoretical assumptions here
are that adapting ideas about capabilities to ethnic conflict lead to
conclusions about military technology, political capacity and mobilization
forms of military organization, the role of the collapsing state or empire,
access to external allies and political geography. For example the findings of
Monica Toft on the relationship between settlement and rebellion are exciting.
According to her, there are three implications; with stronger ties to land
(autochthony) rural residents react to possible threats with more fear than
urbanites, they have a tendency to opt to stay rather than exit and thirdly
rural residents are more likely to react to potential threats in a hostile
manner, All these are based on the geographical factor mentioned earlier and it
perhaps helps to shed more light on the reason as to why most of the ethnic
civil wars are in the rural areas as opposed to urban centres.
History has a great bearing on the
security dilemma. For instance new historical revelations could inform
interpretations of past events and shifts in the level or content of the other
group’s rhetoric could affect assessments of intentions. This was applicable in
the Serbia and Croatia cases. The history of ethnic blood shedding between the
two groups during the World War II creates an impression that the other group
has hostile intentions therefore Serbian perception of history and Croatian
rhetoric contributed to fears of Croatia intentions. This is basically how the
interplay between history and rhetoric bears on the security dilemma because
the involved groups are locked in bitter memories and suspicion which
intensifies the security dilemma.
Consequences of the Security Dilemma
We have already seen the consequences
under the hypotheses as presented by Posen and added by Rose. However, we will
here highlight them with particular emphasis on new ones as presented by Rose.
Posen already identified that an intense security dilemma leads to intensified
arms racing, competitive political mobilizations, enlargement of windows of
vulnerability and opportunity and incentives for defensive expansion and for
attacking first.
From the hypotheses envisioned and added
by Rose to those of Posen, we are again presented with other five more
consequences of security dilemma. It causes itches in diplomacy between groups
for instance in international relations, intense security dilemma causes an
aggressive style of diplomacy. In a security dilemma therefore the fait
accompli of Rose are more common and dangerous ranging up to and including
unhealthy competition trading on zero sum rates and winner take it all modes.
This worked in Ukraine and Croatia. Upon the collapse of Yugoslavia ethnic groups
in Croatia used fait accompli tactics that the other side perceived as
threatening to its vital interests.
Blame shifting becomes more common and
precarious in cases of intense security dilemma. A group can provoke another
into moving first because the target group will feel more insecure. This is
related to the offence-dominance proposed by Van Evera which makes it easier
for states to obscure blame for wars they catalyse for instance the US
incursion of Iraq. This is very common in ethnic groups. One group provokes the
other and due to the security dilemma and the urge for survival, the other
group moves into defensive attacks often motivated by the need to be the first
to strike before being stricken and these states of affair may lead into a
series of shifting blames which often become vicious.
Due to security dilemma, groups
negotiate less and reach fewer agreements. We know the way towards understanding
and resolution of most of the conflicts if not all, lies in dialogue. Anything
that derails the efforts of dialogue is a factor party to exacerbation of
conflict. The security dilemma shakes the foundations of dialogue thus
depriving the groups an opportunity to reach agreements. Intense security
dilemma makes the situation even worse because as Rose argues an intense
security dilemma involves fewer negotiations. With fewer negotiations,
opportunities for cooperation are scaled down leading to constraints in
reaching agreements. When the security dilemma is intense, parties in an ethnic
conflict negotiate less, reach fewer agreements and honour fewer agreements that
are reached if any. Cooperation becomes elusive and as such there are more hard
demands and actions leading to escalation of the conflict situation and war becomes
more likely.
With intense security dilemma groups
become more secretive about their political and military plans. This one is
more common place than any of the foregoing consequences. To grasp it better we
look at how states behave with their security agencies for instance the
military remains the most secretive departments of governments and states. One
strategy in war is to know the arms and capability of the enemy and given such
a situation and with what realists term the looming possibility of war at all
times, states are never ready to disclose their armament and military
capability to other states even their own allies because issues such as
polarity also changes alignments in the system.
However, in a case study on Croatia and
Ukraine this could, be quite the opposite because, there was no much secrecy in
both political and even military advancement among the two parties. Both made
their plans very clear and they pursued them in straight lines. The last but not
least consequence of intense security dilemma is the fact that alliances form
during the time of peace and they become unconditional. This is especially true
because when the security dilemma is intense, groups need allies. Thus the
intense security dilemma stirs the need for alignment with friendly groups to
ensure collective security. This is so much experienced in international
relations with formation of blocs and spheres of cooperation for instance NATO in
the Western powers and in our region there is the EAC standby force. Military
interdependency is more likely to be high between allies under these
circumstances. Again this was not the case in the situation of Croatia and
Ukraine.
Implications for Theory
The tests of hypotheses that we have
looked at as both presented by Posen and Rose have demonstrated workability of
theory. The prediction dimension of this theory is very powerful because it is
supported by historical evidence. Whenever there have been intensive security
dilemma war has been more imminent and mostly intense security dilemma has led
into war. The case study presented here on Croatia and Ukraine has pointed at
this fact. There have been few exceptions for instance in the hypotheses on
secrecy and cooperation but the other hypotheses lead to plausible predictions.
It is not surprising because it is in keeping with the nature of any science.
So the implication is that this theory is supported and it is still tenable.
For instance more likely as it was
expected when the Serbian security dilemma was intense fait accompli were
common, blame shifting prominently featured and in 1991, parties rarely
negotiated, few agreements were reached, and some of the agreements reached were
not honoured. On the contrary in Ukraine which did not perceive an intense
security dilemma, most expected opposite outcomes occurred. This is prove for
the workability and indeed the predictive power of the theory that intense
security dilemma increases the possibility of war.
Implication for Policy
Finally we look at the implication of
this theory on policy. Can it help in formulation of policy and how? This is
all about prescriptive role of theory. It is not enough to hold the claim that when
security dilemma is intense there is more possibility. There is need to look at
the possibility to avert confrontations and possibly war. This as well is a
prerogative of theory given its prescriptive role.
Whenever the security dilemma is
perceived to be intense, there can be taken measures to lessen perceptions of
that intensity thereby reducing chances of confrontations. Policy makers having
been informed by this theory should devise policy such that hostile groups live
in arrangements that are more defensive. Geographically groups can also be
separated (shifting of population) to reduce the chances of direct contact
which through the geographical hypothesis could increase security dilemma. Also
we saw that rural dwellers are more likely to engage in hostile responses than
their counterparts in urban set up. There can be created cities in between
antagonistic groups and transform their lives into urban set up however this
needs long term plans and more resources but it is a possibility as well.
This theory can therefore help to inform
the direction of policy making. Governments for instance may read the mood of
the ethnic groups and ascertain their perceptions of security dilemma and take
measures to avoid its further intensification and possible escalation
beforehand. This way most of the conflicts would be checked and may be most of
the civil wars in Africa and elsewhere in the world could be averted.
Conclusion
It is undeniably factual that security
dilemma plays a key role in ethnic conflicts and even most of the civil wars in
the world today. If we take for instance
the historical colonialism which was a stamping of European imperialism, we
will realize that most of the conflicts in Africa has colonial legacy partly to
blame for the conflicts in the continent. During the partitioning of Africa through
the Berlin boundaries, most ethnic groups were put together with others which
had incompatible interests and when colonialism ended these groups entered into
conflicts most of which can be clearly demonstrated in the framework of
security dilemma that we have already seen. After the colonizers left
(collapse) most ethnic groups sensed danger and had no otherwise but to come up
with ways to ensure their own security. According to security dilemma theory,
one group’s quest to arm itself for defence purpose becomes a threat to another
and this could give an explanation for the local militias for instance
witnessed in Kenya.
The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypothese
Reviewed by Ibrahim Magara
on
December 28, 2015
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