Mali and the Tuareg: A Resolved Matter or Detente?
Mali
Mali gained its independence from France in 1960.
For decades, the country suffered from droughts, rebellions, a coup and 23
years of military dictatorship until democratic elections in 1992. Since then,
Mali was regarded as a model of African democracy until the military seized
power in March 2012. In the confusion which followed the coup, the north fell
under the control of al-Qaeda linked rebel group, Islamic Magreb (AQIM).
The
Tuareg
The Tuareg are a Saharan nomadic people
who live in Mali, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso and Niger. In Mali, the Tuareg
dominate the Saharan portion in the north
The Tuareg have always fought for their independence; at first from the French and later from the Malian central government. They begun serious insurgency against the Bamako administration in early 1990s. The insurgency gained momentum in 2007, and was exacerbated by an influx of arms from the 2011 Lybian civil war (BBC News). Tuareg fighters and mercenaries came to Muammar Ghaddafi’s aid during the Lybian conflict and since the conflict ended, both the Tuareg fighters and other forces fled into the neighboring states, including Mali (ICRC, 2012). Involvement in Libya not only reenergized the Tuareg but also earned them an enemy status in the West. The alliance of convenience between the Tuareg and the AL-Qaeda linked Islamic Magreb (AQIM) complicated the long time civil conflict between the Tuareg and the government of Bamako in late 2011.
The Tuareg have always fought for their independence; at first from the French and later from the Malian central government. They begun serious insurgency against the Bamako administration in early 1990s. The insurgency gained momentum in 2007, and was exacerbated by an influx of arms from the 2011 Lybian civil war (BBC News). Tuareg fighters and mercenaries came to Muammar Ghaddafi’s aid during the Lybian conflict and since the conflict ended, both the Tuareg fighters and other forces fled into the neighboring states, including Mali (ICRC, 2012). Involvement in Libya not only reenergized the Tuareg but also earned them an enemy status in the West. The alliance of convenience between the Tuareg and the AL-Qaeda linked Islamic Magreb (AQIM) complicated the long time civil conflict between the Tuareg and the government of Bamako in late 2011.
Rebellion
and coup d'état
The rebels in Mali launched their
insurgency in January 2012 with an intention to establish an independent Tuareg
state in the north known as the Azawad. In March 21 2012, the soldiers stormed
the presidential palace in the capital, Bamako, overthrowing Amadou Toumani
Toure, the democratically elected president. However, the faction of the Malian
military that overthrew the government was not a Tuareg faction but a Bambara
one. This was protest on the military’s perception of the government’s
unwillingness to take a strong action against the Tuareg (Lynch,
2012).
In the confusion that followed the coup d'état the rebels launched a new offensive and succeeded in taking the
capitals of the three main northern provinces of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. Islamists
seized control of the ancient trading hub Timbuktu alongside Tuareg rebels and
chased out their allies and declared to residents and religious leaders that
they were imposing Sharia law, which according to Meeker (2013) led to serious violations
of human rights.
Has humanitarian crisis ensued, it was necessary
that deliberate measures be taken not only by the Mali government but also by
the international community and regional bodies to address the political
conflict in Mali, restore civilian rule in order to salvage the situation. Despite calls for diplomatic
mediation in Mali, the UN and western powers failed to make any serious efforts
to come to a political solution, instead, they adopted resolution 2071 to
authorize an African-backed intervention (Quinn, 2012).
In
October 12, 2012, the Security Council adopted a resolution allowing military
intervention against rebels in northern Mali. While western powers sought to
justify their call for intervention on the worsening humanitarian crisis in the
Sahel, Simon Allison (2012) points out that the determining factors for
intervention were rather different. In addition, Jeremie Labbe (2012) argues that
an international military intervention in northern Mali “could further
destabilize an already extremely fragile humanitarian crisis” and very well
inflict harm on the population” views which were shared with Peter Maurer,
President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (2012).
French
intervention
Intervention “refers to conduct with an
external animus that credibly intends
to achieve a fundamental alteration of the state of affairs in the target nation.”
It also refers to “organized and systematic activities across recognized
boundaries aimed at: affecting the political authority structures of the
target” (Bon & Mings, 1980, p. 5).
However absent from these definitions
are specific features such as a statement of objectives, post-hoc
justifications for actions, or any time dimension which have implications in
the just war theory as my colleagues will present. An intervention is when a
superior power, a nation, or an international organization transcends the
framework of the existing relations and attempts to impose its will on weaker
nation in defense of some concept of political, moral, or legal order, and with
a limited duration in mind. We see that there is an element of morality even
amidst the realistic approaches to war (Utley, 2002).
“Dependencia” has been identified as one
of the reasons for the French interventions in Africa. This is a situation
whereby the peripheral areas of Africa are dependent upon their former
metropolis and allies for political stability, economic benefits and strategic
security. In their article Bon and Mingst (1980), have tried to examine the
motives behind the French intervention in Mali. They are not judgmental but they
have clearly given strong arguments that point at reasons for the French
intervention not only in Mali but also in Africa. It is necessary to note that according
to Bon and Mingst (1980), national interest, presence and relevance, strong
bond created by historical colonialism are some of the reasons for French
intervention. The French
justified its intervention in Mali on humanitarian and security grounds. If
indeed this was the case then one may say the intention was good but was the
military intervention the only option or were there any other options and did
this intervention become as the last resort? These are some of the issues,
which my colleagues, in this conference, will look into.
France
has always demonstrated a tendency to want to maintain its status as an
important player in the international scene through interventions in Africa.
France consistently defended itself by arguing that it had no any interest
whatsoever in Mali other than rescuing a friendly state. However, fighting
terrorism in the vicinity of Niger, the producer of a significant portion of
the uranium used in France’s power plants raises some questions (Think Africa
Press, 2013). As we have been discussing in class; beneath intensions are
interests and beneath interests are motives which are often difficult to
unravel and which compromise the just war theory.
The
intervention was described as a success in the strictest sense of international
law. Along with the UN Security Council Resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085, the
request for military support from France, made by Mali’s interim president,
Diancounda Traore provided the legal basis for Operation Serval. However, not everyone welcomes the French intervention
in Mali and in the African continent. For instance Algerian newspaper, Liberte, commented on France’s
intervention in Mali with this statement: “The French military intervention has
been code-named Serval. For those who do not know, the serval is an African cat
of prey that has the peculiar trait of urinating thirty times an hour to mark
its territory. Spot on!” (Think Africa Press, 2013).
Bibliography
Allison, S. (17
October, 2012). Guardian: Military
Intervention in Mali: A Dangerous Idea With Too
Much Support.
ICRC. (2012). Available online at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resource...
[Accessed 25 September 2013].
Labbé, J. (14 December, 2012). International Peace Institute December 14, 2012 the humanitarian
fallout of military intervention in Mali
Lynch, C. (October 8, 2012). The Bicycle Theory of International Diplomacy Drives Mali Debate into Slow Motion
Available online at: <wwwglobaldiplomacy.org/ghumanitarianintervention.html>
[Accessed September 27 2 2013].
Meeker, K. (2013). Quora. Available online at: http://www.quora.com/French-Intervention-in- Mali-January-2013/What-is-the-Touareg-situation-in-Mali [Accessed September 20 2013].
Mingst,
K. & Bon, D (1980). French intervention in Africa: Dependency or
decolonization. Africa Today,
27(2), 5-20.
Quinn, A. (October 29, 2012). Reuters.Avaialble
online at: http://www.reuters.com/
[Accessed September 28, 2013].
Think Africa
Press (March 18, 2013). Mali: Old Wine in New Bottles? Available online
at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52363-mali-old-wine-in-new- bottles.html?itemid=id#26087
[Accessed September 27 2013].
Utley,
R. (2002). ‘Not to do less but to do better...’: French military policy in
Africa. International Affairs,
78(1), 129-146.
Mali and the Tuareg: A Resolved Matter or Detente?
Reviewed by Ibrahim Magara
on
March 13, 2017
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