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Ethiopia’s Troubled Political Transition Beyond the Military Action in Tigray

The armed conflict between Ethiopia’s federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the country’s northern Tigray region is raging on despite Prime Minister (PM) Abiy Ahmed’s declaration of victory and end of the operation[1] a few weeks after its commencement in November 2020. The humanitarian crisis[2] is said to be deteriorating even as there are contestations as to the levels of humanitarian access to the region.


Besides the human cost of the conflict, Tigray has been under communication shutdown[3] since the conflict started in November 4th 2020. Ironically, PM Abiy whose government continues to impose a communication shutdown – arguably in a bid to place his military campaign behind dark veils – has decried[4] what he says is spread of falsehoods calling on Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia “to defeat disinformation by telling the international community the truth”. Abiy’s decision to launch this military action at a time when global attention was on the US elections and his decision to impose a total communication shutdown in Tigray were arguably aimed at placing the operation behind the veils. Nevertheless, media world-over, was awash with news about the break of conflict in Tigray followed by an avalanche of op-eds and opinion pieces ever since. This, in itself, is laudable because it reveals how difficult it is now for any leader to silently wage a bloody conflict or cause a genocide. This was not the case a few decades ago. For instance, in 1994 the international media overly focussed[5] on covering elections in South Africa while a genocide was underway in Rwanda. 


Away from the human cost of the conflict, access to humanitarian aid and information, a dangerous binarism and attempts to foreclose discourse on alternatives to violence have since emerged in regard to the situation in Ethiopia. With the use of phrases such as ‘so called analysists’, there is emerging open and rampant hostility to independent thought, especially if and when, in their attempts to make sense of the situation, analysists, disagree with the official narrative. There are attempts, largely spearheaded by supporters of PM Abiy’s apparent ultra-nationalistic ideals[6], to force the debate into two diametrically opposed narratives and groupings; an angel-devil prism in which the federal government is framed as all right/good and the TPLF as all wrong/evil. As a result, the emerging narrative as regards the positions you take on the conflict is that you are either in support of Abiy’s agenda – who is projected as the vision-bearer of a unitary and prosperous Ethiopia and defender of the interests of the nation – or you are the supporter or sympathiser of the TPLF hence an enemy of Ethiopia. This stark binarism seeks to foreclose possibilities of alternative voices, especially those that may seek to independently assess the merits and demerits of this particular military action, and generally the use of violence to deal with political problems.


History of the conflict


The current armed conflict in Tigray is part of a history of broader antagonism between Ethiopia’s regional governments and the centre. Some commentators[7] blame this lethal antagonism on the country’s ethno-federal system established and sustained by the TPLF-dominated Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), that ruled Ethiopia for nearly three decades. For instance, De Waal,[8] argues that this conflict is a culmination of ‘years of darkness.’ Rising from an empire nation[9], Ethiopia’s later configurations, especially as crafted by the TPLF into a violent ethnic-federal republic, has historically pitted[10] the country’s ethnic groups against each other raising concerns over its viability as a modern republic.  


The TPLF-led EPRDF toppled the Derg, a military junta, which after ousting Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 went on to rule Ethiopia with an iron fist for about two decades. The TPLF-dominated federal government Ethiopia was to adopt a developmental state approach, particularly under former Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, which saw the country record rapid development. Without necessarily agreeing with some of his grand assumptions, Cheeseman[11], has recently questioned Ethiopia’s ‘authoritarian development’ model arguing that it may not be sustainable. It may be too early to tell whether or not Ethiopia’s model of development is sustainable, but how the country will navigate through the current conflict will contribute to shaping its political futures.  


Abiy Ahmed’s premiership  


Abiy Ahmed, a former TPLF functionary and who is identified as ethnic Oromo, dramatically rose into the helm of the country’s leadership in 2018 following months of unrest.  His quick domestic reforms[12] and rapprochement with his Eritrean counterpart, Isaias Afwerki, that ended decades of hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea[13] partly contributed to his winning of the Global Peace Prize, although some observers[14]now think that ‘this prize-winning peace deal was little more than a military pact designed to crush the TPLF once and for all’. The TPLF has been Afwerki’s enemy since dragging Ethiopia into a full-blown war[15] with Eritrea in 1998. Abiy’s rapprochement with Afwerki may have included a pact to eliminate the TPLF for there are claims[16] of the presence of Eritrean military in Tigray.


Abiy’s premiership has been defined by ever-increasing antagonism[17] with the TPLF. Part of his attempts to reconfigure Ethiopia’s politics was the formation of the Prosperity Party[18] which the TPLF opposed widening the rift between Addis Ababa and Mek’ele, the capital of Tigray. Dislodged from power in Addis Ababa and having fallen out with the PM, the TPLF retreated to its northern enclave in Tigray where they continued with their onslaught against the federal government. There seems to be consensus among observers[19] that the TPLF leadership clearly and persistently continued to provocatively pursue a dangerous and hostile agenda aimed at systematically undermining Abiy’s leadership. As Fisher[20] rightly observes “many of Abiy’s efforts to distance his administration from that of his predecessors, and to hold TPLF officials to account were welcomed, both domestically and internationally”.


While Abiy’s confrontation with the TPLF went on for a while. For example, the TPLF held regional elections in defiance[21] of Addis Ababa and later own declared that Mek’ele does not recognise Abiy’s premiership. The ensuing confrontation between Mek’ele and Addis Ababa were to culminate in an attack on the ENDF’s northern command base in Tigray marking the breaking of an all-out military confrontation. Abiy’s decision to launch a military action has seen him emerge as an increasingly polarising leader with some critics[22] now questioning the decision to award him the Nobel Peace Prize. Criticism notwithstanding, Abiy enjoys a euphoric support in Ethiopia, especially by urbanists and people of mixed ethnicities. Espousing ultra-national ideals, Abiy promises to rapidly steer Ethiopia away from ethnic-federalism towards what he argues is a ‘new Ethiopia’[23]. Whether his attempts to rapidly reconfigure Ethiopia, a country so complex and diverse, will succeed remains to be seen.


Implications of the military action


The humanitarian situation is worsening with the end to the armed conflict remaining uncertain. Some  observers[24] predict a protracted political crisis that may arguably lead to government of Ethiopia’s own fears[25]of possible state degeneration. Like any other military action, the operation in Tigray poses significant dilemmas. The world, Africa in particular, is littered with examples of attempts at military solutions that came with huge costs. For example, in regard to the protracted crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), dia Wamba[26] offers some clear insights on the limitations of the military option. While not in the scale of the DRC, Ethiopia’s is a protracted political crisis whose resolution may easily elide a quick military fix.


Having fallen out with the TPLF and given the fact that the party dominated Ethiopia’s military and economic ranks, it is observed[27] that Abiy’s ‘power base is among a mostly Amhara political elite that wants to abolish the federal system in favour of a unitary government system.’ Riding on Amhara support to dismantle the TPLF in Tigray comes with significant implications on Ethiopia’s ethno-political dynamics for indeed the history of the conflict largely draws on the rivalry [28] between Tigrinya and Amhara over the country’s leadership and resources.


This military action is equally being executed with significant regional implications with some  observers[29] warning that chances of “regional players with their own agendas, notably Eritrea and Sudan, being drawn in remain extremely high”. As mentioned above, there are claims of Eritrean military involvement[30] in the ongoing operation in Tigray leading to a worrying internationalisation[31] of the conflict whose longer-term implications on Ethiopia and the region are yet to be determined.


Calls for dialogue and emerging binarism


Immediately after launching the military action in Tigray there were widespread calls for dialogue including from the African Union (AU) which offered to mediate; an offer which Ethiopia rejected[32]. Abiy’s rejection of dialogue has since resulted in peculiar anti-dialogue sentiments among his supporters. These range from perceivable mere emotive anti-TPLF sentiments to strong arguments, such as that advanced by former PM Hailemariam Desalegn[33] who not only faults the historical record of dialogue as a way to resolve political disputes but also thinks that accepting to dialogue with the TPLF risks conferring legitimacy on a rogue entity and elevating its leadership to undeserved moral stature.


The TPLF’s attack on the ENDF base on November 4th 2020, killing scores of unsuspecting soldiers has been widely used as a justification for the ensuing military action. Understandably, Abiy[34] has stated that “no government can tolerate its soldiers and innocent civilians being ambushed and killed in their dozens, as happened at the hands of the TPLF”. There are other commentators, like Bronwyn[35] who argue that “it is hard to see how it (the TPLF problem) can be resolved through dialogue.” There are other arguments, like Abbink’s[36] whose justification for military action are based on supposed difficult choices that lay ahead.


TPLF’s legacies of violence, particularly the November 4th incident have led to strong anti-dialogue sentiments. The emerging narrative – largely propagated in cyber spaces by supporters of Abiy – is that questioning the military option and/or proposing dialogue as a possible (viable) alternative, is equivalent to being a TPLF operative, enabler, supporter or sympathizer. This creates a problematic binarism, reminiscent of Bush’s famous assertions – following the unfortunate events of 9/11 – that ‘you are either with us or with the terrorists’[37]. Like Bush’s use of the tragic event of 9/11, Abiy is deploying the tragic event of 11/4 to justify the military option and depict all those suggesting dialogue as enemies of Ethiopia. In so doing, anyone who attempts to appraise the use of (legitimate) violence as (the only) solution to (illegitimate) violence is portrayed as the enemy and dismissed. What this does, as Butler[38] argues, is foreclose intellectual discourses, disparage those who caution against war and advance a false narrative depicting them as engaged in vagaries of moral relativism. This rhetoric, especially when perpetuated by leaders, as is the case currently in Ethiopia, reifies a dangerous binarism that chokes any attempts to critically appraise the political use of violence as a (viable) solution to political problems.


Abiy’s refusal to consider the possibilities that a non-military option offers and the long-term implications of attempts at quick military fixes may, in the long term, proof costly. And for avoidance of doubt, I do not think it is easy for any government to tolerate what the TPLF did. I therefore, agree with Abiy[39] that no government can tolerate what the TPLF did. But the call for non-violent options, such as dialogue, does not necessarily imply condoning TPLF’s atrocities for indeed a dialogue process may equally result in holding to account those responsible for crimes. While accepting to dialogue with the TPLF may appear like a weakness on the part of the federal government, magnanimity is a great quality of leaders of nations, especially when weighing the costs and benefits of decisions as grave as military action. Those are tough decisions that leaders are confronted with and to which they must be held to account. Abiy will therefore, have to contend with the question on whether or not the military action was the best option under the circumstances; a question that will linger for a very long time.


Which way now for Ethiopia?


Whereas Abiy[40] claims that the ‘rule of law enforcement operation’ in Tigray long ended, the TPLF is now ‘removed for good’ and Ethiopia is on track to recovery and greatness, there are indications that the situation is wanting. For example, as recounted by International Crisis Group[41], the conflict has come at a very high cost; it has killed thousands, displaced over two million (internally) and over fifty thousand (externally), the humanitarian situation remains dire, with Tigray still largely under communication shutdown.


It is difficult to see how an all-inclusive government in Ethiopia can possibly emerge out of Abiy’s, largely personalised, approach to politics as a viable replacement to absolutist traditions of the TPLF. It would appear to me that Abiy’s approach to Ethiopia’s fragile transition, particularly the military action against the TPLF in Tigray, does not necessarily address a culture of violence, stemming from politicisation of identity[42] which pre-dates the TPLF. The military action may disrupt the dynamics and dislocate the centres of the conflict but may not resolve the issues beneath Ethiopia’s complex political transition.


As observed by Lyons[43], having seized power in the early 90s, the TPLF was confronted with the real challenge of how to organise and rule the Ethiopian society.  Aware that they represented a tiny community further north and that Ethiopia was a complex multi-ethnic society[44], the TPLF had to calculatedly exploited existing ethnic fractures cobbling together an ethnic-based federal coalition through which they went on to rule Ethiopia for decades. Without legitimising TPLF’s legacies, its political manoeuvring that enabled them to capture and retain power at the centre, may arguably not necessarily be the problem. The TPLF’s problem, in my view, relate to instrumentalization of ethnicity and a creation of a violent and predatory state. Unfortunately, such a predatory state and politized ethnicity have since acquired a life of their own. In view of this, the apparent reduction of Ethiopia’s problem to TPLF’s ethnic-federal system is problematic because it creates a false impression that removal of the TPLF and dismantling of the ethno-federal system will solve the country’s political troubles. I am afraid that even if the ongoing military action results in the perceived fall[45] of the TPLF, it may not necessarily solve Ethiopia’s complex transition due other equally important threats[46].


Abiy’s decision and approach portray him as a leader willing to take major political risks. This may be good or bad depending on who is looking at it; importantly the issues at play. Away from the ongoing ‘feel-good’ sentiments embodied in Abiy’s proclamation of victory[47] and the rhetoric of success as expressed, for example, by slogans like #EthiopiaPrevails, Ethiopia is reeling from an awfully mismanaged transition. The solution out of the current crisis most likely resides in establishing platforms through which the people of Ethiopia can (re)imagine management of diversity through collective leadership approaches which hardly emerge out of military victories. By settling on a military action, Abiy went for a huge gamble[48] out of which Ethiopia may emerge as an un-replicable success story or sadly collapse.


[1] Reuters (28 November 2020). Ethiopian military operation in Tigray is complete, prime minister says. Available online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-idUSKBN28809E (accessed 09 February 2021)

[2] OCHA (n.d.). Ethiopia-Tigray region humanitarian update available at: https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia/; ReliefWeb. (19 January 2021). UNHCR finds dire need in Eritrean refugee camps cut off in Tigray conflict: Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unhcr-finds-dire-need-eritrean-refugee-camps-cut-tigray-conflict (Accessed 10 February 2021)

[3] The East African. (05 November 2020). Ethiopia shuts down telephone, internet services in Tigray. Available online at: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-telephone-internet-services-tigray-2731442 (Accessed 09 February 2021).

[4] Fana Broadcasting Corporate. (02 February 2021). PM urges diaspora community to fight against spread of false information about Ethiopia. Available online at: https://www.fanabc.com/english/pm-urges-diaspora-community-to-fight-against-spread-of-false-information-about-ethiopia/ (Accessed 12 February 2021).

[5] Horace, G. C. (2020). The Journey of Wamba dia Wamba and the struggles for emancipatory politics in Africa Horace G. Campbell. Africa Development, Volume XLV (2),143-165.

[6] Getachew, A. (04 November 2018). Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister calls for unity. Available online at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-s-new-prime-minister-calls-for-unity/1115112 (Accessed 10 February 2021).

[7] Sudi, S. B. (08 January 2021). Authoritarian aid: A reply to Prof. Cheeseman: http://democracyinafrica.org/authoritarian-aid-a-reply-to-prof-cheeseman/ (Accessed 19 January 2021).

[8] De Waal, A. 15 November 2020. Tigray crisis viewpoint: Why Ethiopia is spiralling out of control:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54932333?fbclid=IwAR3Lt8S0fe4LvIfGStNna B51MLNyiiHFtTiEaW6irma8KXaEWl_fpjoFFs (accessed 20 January 2021).

[9]  Smith, L. (2013). Making citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, gender and national identity in Ethiopia. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/making-citizens-inafrica/F2A8DC5D97A3B68FD38F0F1BDCB30449 (Accessed 05 February 2021).

[10] Mamdani, M. (03 January 2019). The trouble with Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/opinion/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-reforms-ethnic-conflict-ethnic-federalism.html. (Accessed 26 January 2021).

[11] Cheeseman, N. (22 December 2020). The conflict in Ethiopia calls into question authoritarian aid: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/22/conflict-in-ethiopia-calls-into-question-authoritarian-aid-pub-83515 (accessed 16 January 2021)

[12] The Guardian. (08 July 2018). These changes are unprecedented': how Abiy is upending Ethiopian politics

Available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics (Accessed 03 February 2021).

[13] Demissie, S. T.  (11 September 2020). The Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal is yet to show dividends https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-eritrea-ethiopia-peace-deal-is-yet-to-show-dividends (accessed 21 January 2021)

[14] Zelalem, Z. (19 January 2021). Starvation crisis looms as aid groups seek urgent Tigray access: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/19/ethiopia-hesitant-to-allow-aid-agencies-into-tigray (accessed 21 January 2021).

[15] Institute for Policy Studies. (11 October 2005). The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Available online at: https://ips-dc.org/the_war_between_ethiopia_and_eritrea/ (accessed 09 February 2021).

[16] Marks, S. (09 February 2021). EU accuses Eritrean forces of fuelling conflict in Ethiopia. Available online at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-09/eu-accuses-eritrea-forces-of-fueling-conflict-in-ethiopia-region (Accessed 11 February 2021)

[17] Fisher, J. (11 November 2020). Ethiopia: At the roots of the conflict in Tigray. Available online at: https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ethiopia-roots-conflict-tigray-28220 (Accessed 27 January 2021).

[18] Gedamu, Y. (10 December 2019). Ethiopia’s new party is welcome news, but faces big hurdles

Available online at: https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-new-party-is-welcome-news-but-faces-big-hurdles-128551 (Accessed 28 January 2021).

[19] Feldstein, S. (01 December 2020). Ethiopia’s conflict in Tigray presents hard decisions. Available online at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/01/ethiopia-s-conflict-in-tigray-presents-hard-decisions-pub-83369 (Accessed 08 February 2021); Walsh, D. & Marks, S. (15 November 2020). They once ruled Ethiopia. Now they are fighting its government.

Available online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-tigray.html (Accessed 08 February 2021)

[20] Fisher, J. (11 November 2020).

[21] Paravicini, G. (09 September 2020). Ethiopia's Tigray holds regional election in defiance of federal government. Available online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-politics/ethiopias-tigray-holds-regional-election-in-defiance-of-federal-government-idUKKBN2602QU (Accessed 09 February 2021).

[22] Tsehaye, V. (10 December 2019). Opinion: Abiy Ahmed’s Nobel Peace Prize win is a flawed decision:  https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/10/opinions/abiy-ahmed-ethiopia-nobel-prize-2019-opinion/index.html (accessed 21 January 2021).

[23] Abiy, A. (06 February 2021). Toward a peaceful order in the Horn of Africa. Available online at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ethiopia-removal-of-tigray-tplf-will-benefit-region-by-abiy-ahmed-2021-02?fbclid=IwAR1I0Opsh2aIdyu7scOEWm-bqLHcN-8t_GRwrgtnw5RHWwBlzAqM6npgBII (Accessed 09 February 2021).

[24] De Waal, A. (15 November 2020).

[25] Federal Government of Ethiopia. (2002). The federal democratic republic of Ethiopia foreign affairs and national security policy strategy. Available online at: https://www.coursehero.com/file/55291278/Ethiopia-national-security-policy-and-strategypdf/ (accessed 21 January 2021).

[26] Horace, G. C. (2020). The Journey of Wamba dia Wamba and the struggles for emancipatory politics in Africa Horace G. Campbell. Africa Development, Volume XLV (2),143-165, p. 162.

[27] De Waal, A. 15 November 2020

[28] Reid, R. (02 February 2021). Dissonant horn: Ethiopia’s current crisis is rooted in a long history of regional and ethnic defiance towards the political centre. History Today. https://www.historytoday.com/archive/behind-times/dissonant-horn (accessed 02 February 2021).

[29] Fisher, J. (11 November 2020). Ethiopia: At the roots of the conflict in Tigray. Available online at: https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ethiopia-roots-conflict-tigray-28220 (Accessed 27 January 2021).

[30] The Economist. (22 January 2021). Evidence mounts that Eritrean forces are in Ethiopia:

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/01/02/evidence-mounts-that-eritrean-forces-are-in-ethiopia (accessed 20 January 2021); Zelalem, Z. & Brown, W. (08 January 2021). Eritrea’s brutal shadow war in Ethiopia laid bare: 

 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/climate-and-people/eritreas-shadow-war-ethiopia-laid-bare-amid-accusations-eritrean/ (accessed 20 January 2021).

[31] Maru, M. T. (12 February 2021). The UN must intervene in Tigray. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/five-reasons-why-un-must-intervene-in-tigray-ethiopia-by-mehari-taddele-maru-2021-02 (Accessed 13 February 2021).

[32] The East African (21 November 2020). Ethiopia rejects African Union mediation offer.

Available online at: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-rejects-au-mediation-offer-3205612 (Accessed 09 January 2021).

[33] Desalegn, H. (24 November 2020). Ethiopia’s government and the TPLF leadership are not morally equivalent. Available online at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/24/ethiopia-tigray-war-endf-tplf-abiy-ahmed-federal-government-not-morally-equivalent/ (Accessed 27 January 2021).

[34] Abiy, A. (06 February 2021).

[35] Bronwyn, B. (13 November 2020). Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war. Available online at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/calls-for-negotiation-driving-ethiopia-deeper-into-war/ (Accessed 09 February 2021).

[36] Abbink, J. (25 January 2021). The Tigray conflict in Ethiopia: Post-war ramifications and international response

Available online at: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/01/tigray-conflict-ethiopia-ramifications-international-response/?fbclid=IwAR2X0uI4UZ-a4rZQXIPkfPyAwARKYUGxR0k9IEBroIIxZ-WoQp0WGTnzcTY (Accessed 09 February 2021).

[37] VOA (27 October 2009). Bush: 'You are either with us, or with the terrorists' - 2001-09-21

Available online at: https://www.voanews.com/archive/bush-you-are-either-us-or-terrorists-2001-09-21 (Accessed 08 February 2021).

[38] Butler, J. (2006). Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence. London: Verso.

[39] Abiy, A. (06 February 2021).

[41] International Crisis Group. (11 February 2021). Finding a path to peace in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Available online at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/167-finding-path-peace-ethiopias-tigray-region (Accessed 12 February 2021).

[42] Oumer, B. (15 December 2020).Ethiopia’s diversity challenge and the politicisation of identity. Available at: https://www.awashpost.com/2020/12/15/ethiopias-diversity-challenge-and-the-politicization-of-identity/ (Accessed 12 February 2021).

[43] Lyons, T. (2019). The puzzle of Ethiopian politics. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[44] Gardner, T. (06 January 2021). All is not quiet on Ethiopia’s western front. Available online at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/06/ethiopia-benishangul-gumuz-violence-gerd-western-front/ (Accessed 12 February 2021)

[45] The Guardian. (25 November 2020). Rise and fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from rebels to rulers and back. Available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/25/rise-and-fall-of-ethiopias-tplf-tigray-peoples-liberation-front (Accessed 11 February 2021).

[46] White, P. (March 2020). Threats to Ethiopia’s fragile democratic transition. Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/threats-to-ethiopias-fragile-democratic-transition/ (Accessed 09 January 2021).

[47] Abiy, A. (06 February 2021).

[48] Carbone, G. & Casola, C. (01 February 2021). Abiy’s Gamble: Regional Spillovers of Ethiopia’s Tigray CrisiAvailable online at: https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/abiys-gamble-regional-spillovers-ethiopias-tigray-crisis-29021 (Accessed 09 February 2021). 

Ethiopia’s Troubled Political Transition Beyond the Military Action in Tigray Ethiopia’s Troubled Political Transition Beyond the Military Action in Tigray Reviewed by Ibrahim Magara on April 11, 2021 Rating: 5

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